Careers / Anthropic
Open role
Applied AI Architect ( Global Customers) at Anthropic
A senior-level LLM and GenAI Engineer role at Anthropic, based in Bangalore, India. Senior LLM/GenAI engineers build production systems that safely prompt large models, retrieve data via RAG, evaluate outputs, enforce guardrails, and balance cost with latency. Interviews test deep knowledge of LLM attack surfaces, system design for safety and performance, and ability to ship secure, evaluated applications under real constraints.
- 8 skills
- 10 interview questions
- 6 labs
The role
- CompanyAnthropic
- LocationBangalore, India
- Listed14 days ago
- LevelSenior
We are not the employer. You apply through the company careers page.
Your readiness for this role
Sign in to see how ready you are for LLM and GenAI Engineer roles, skill by skill, and what to do next. Or look at the full LLM and GenAI Engineer career track.
Tailored to this job Premium
The pack on this page fits this kind of role. Premium members also get a version read from this exact advert: what this employer stresses, what it requires, how to pitch yourself, five extra questions written for it, and the five questions from the set most worth practising.
Skills this role needs
- Prompt injection attack & defenseCore vulnerability in LLM apps; engineers must recognize and block multi-stage, encoded, and indirect injection vectors.
- RAG security and poisoningRetrieval systems are attack entry points; must secure ingestion, embedding, retrieval ranking, and cross-tenant isolation.
- Agent hijacking and tool controlLLM agents with tool access create new threat models; engineers must design permission boundaries and validate tool calls.
- Output validation and safetyModel output is untrusted; must implement schema validation, filter XSS/SQL injection paths, and handle agent-generated credentials.
- Evaluation and guardrailsSenior role requires designing metrics to catch failures, red-teaming applications, and implementing runtime guards.
- LLM cost and latency optimizationProduction systems must balance safety with performance; senior engineers trade off token count, caching, and model choice.
- Memory and state managementPersistent agent memory, chat history, and context windows create injection, poisoning, and leakage risks at scale.
- System design for multi-agent and supply chainComplex systems with spawned agents, MCP tools, and third-party dependencies require threat modeling across boundaries.
Labs to practise
Hands-on labs on this site that match the work in this role. They run in the browser.
- AI Prompt Injection — Sales BotLab
- AI Role-Confusion Injection — Make User Text Look Like System InstructionsLab
- AI Prompt Firewall — Detect Multi-Stage Bypass Attempts (Defender's Lab)Lab
- AI Jailbreak — Multi-turn Roleplay BypassLab
- Nothing Worth Leaking — Rebuild a System Prompt That Will Be ExtractedLab
- AI System Prompt ExtractionLab
Courses that help
Tutorials to read
- AI Pentesting 2026: The Day Traditional Pentesting Stopped Working | Offensive AI Operator Course Day 1 of 30Tutorial
- AI Recon: Fingerprint Any LLM App in 10 Minutes | Offensive AI Operator Day 2 of 30Tutorial
- How to Assess LLM Fine Tuning Security in 2026 – Dataset Poisoning, Training Attacks and Fine-Tune Vulnerabilities | AI LLM Hacking Course Day 38 of 90Tutorial
- AI Adversarial Document Lab: Crafted Markdown Defeats the SummariserTutorial
- AI Role-Confusion Lab: Make User Text Look Like a System RuleTutorial
- AI LLM-Driven SSRF Lab: Push the Agent's Fetch Tool InwardTutorial
Mock interview questions
Ten questions from our LLM and GenAI Engineer question set, picked for this listing. Answer in your own words first, then open what a strong answer covers.
Your team built a system prompt into the model context, and a user tried 20 different jailbreak techniques to extract it. What patterns would you look for in logs, and what guardrail would you add to make extraction attempts detectable or costly?
What a strong answer covers
- Jailbreak detection (frequency, encoding, role-play patterns)
- Rate limiting and anomaly detection on prompt-attack signals
- System prompt hardening (refusal, circular context, decoys)
Your system uses a shared embedding cache to speed up RAG retrieval across all users. A researcher shows you a timing side-channel that leaks which documents other users queried. How would you detect and patch this vulnerability without rebuilding the cache?
What a strong answer covers
- Cross-tenant cache leakage via timing, side channels, or state reuse
- Cache isolation, per-user cache keys, and timing-safe operations
- Trade-off between performance and isolation (padding, bucketing)
You're reviewing a code change generated by an AI coding assistant. The assistant produced a function that parses user input directly into a database query and passes generated tokens to the auth layer. List the flaws and explain how you'd enforce these checks in CI/CD.
What a strong answer covers
- AI-generated code vulnerabilities (injection, token forgery, schema bypass)
- AI-aware security scanning (detecting LLM output trust, hallucination)
- CI/CD rules for LLM-generated code review and dependency verification
Your chatbot supports file upload and uses the uploaded document as context for LLM queries. An attacker uploads a file containing an indirect prompt injection (instructions hidden in a table or summary). How does the attack work, and what's your defense?
What a strong answer covers
- Indirect injection via RAG (document→context→prompt)
- Data vs. instruction separation, document provenance tracking
- Redaction and sanitization of untrusted document context
Your system maintains persistent agent memory (conversation history, learned user preferences). An attacker poisons the memory with false instructions that influence future queries. Design a defense that doesn't require discarding all history.
What a strong answer covers
- Memory poisoning via tool output or user message injection
- Memory versioning, audit trails, and rollback mechanisms
- Per-statement memory validation and instruction vs. data separation
You're integrating a third-party MCP tool that your LLM agent will use autonomously. The vendor-provided tool description is lengthy and includes examples. What's the attack surface, and what validation would you add before connecting it?
What a strong answer covers
- Tool poisoning via description, examples, and return values
- Tool sandboxing, permission boundaries, and schema validation
- MCP security review (rogue servers, tool deserialization, hidden side effects)
Your system uses a fine-tuned model trained on proprietary data. An attacker discovers they can extract training examples word-for-word by carefully crafting prompts. What safeguards would you add during fine-tuning and deployment?
What a strong answer covers
- Training data extraction and memorization risks
- Differential privacy, data deduplication, and synthetic data techniques
- Output filtering and membership inference defenses
You're building a system that accepts a user's GitHub issue and generates code to resolve it. An attacker submits a poisoned issue that tricks the coding agent into introducing a vulnerability. Describe the attack and how you'd lock down the agent's execution environment.
What a strong answer covers
- Indirect prompt injection via external data (GitHub issues, comments, PRs)
- Agent sandboxing, code review gates, and limited tool permissions
- Separation of issue text from executable instructions
You're designing a multi-tenant LLM service where each tenant has a custom system prompt. A user discovers they can craft a prompt that makes the model output another tenant's system prompt or data. How would you isolate tenants?
What a strong answer covers
- Multi-tenant isolation and cross-tenant prompt/data leakage
- Per-tenant tokenization and embedding spaces
- Instruction injection between tenants and context window boundaries
Your system uses a knowledge base that's updated frequently by external sources. You discover that one source was compromised and injected false information. Design a process to detect, isolate, and remediate poisoned documents without manual review of the entire corpus.
What a strong answer covers
- RAG poisoning detection and remediation at scale
- Document source validation and version control
- Automated rollback, fact-checking, and anomaly detection in retrieval results
A 14-day preparation plan
- Days 1 to 3Complete OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications course (5628) to map the full LLM threat landscape. Simultaneously work through OWASP reading (4361) on modern pentesting. Practice hands-on with foundational prompt injection labs: prompt-injection-1, ai-role-confusion-1, ai-system-leak-1. Focus on understanding how instructi
- Days 4 to 7Take Prompt Injection From Zero course (5533) for attack-and-defend depth. Work through advanced jailbreak labs: ai-encoding-jailbreak-1, ai-jailbreak-roleplay-1, ai-many-shot-jailbreak-1. Read the AI Agent Hijacking lab (5157) and Tool-Output Injection lab (5158). Design a prompt-hardening exercise using ai-review-pro
- Days 8 to 11Take Securing AI Agents and MCP course (5537) to master agent threats. Work through agent-specific labs: ai-plan-injection-1, ai-agent-hijack-1, ai-token-smuggling-1. Read the Confused Deputy (5160) and SSRF (5161) lab documents. Practice RAG security via ai-review-rag-ingestion-1 and ai-embedding-poisoning-1. Build me
- Days 12 to 14Synthesize learning by reviewing system-design questions: design a multi-tenant RAG system, harden a production agent, and trade off cost/latency/safety. Work through output validation labs: ai-review-output-sinks-1, ai-output-schema-bypass-1. Read the AI Recon and AI Assessment readings (4372, 4418). Create a personal
Apply on Anthropic's siteBack to all roles
The interview questions, skills and plan on this page are SecurityElites practice material for this kind of role. They are not supplied or endorsed by Anthropic, and the real interview may differ.