Real MCP Attacks 2026 — Four Case Studies Dissected End to End | MCP Security Day 5 of 7
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Prompt injection is the most common way AI applications are attacked. This guide explains what it is, how it works, what it has done in real systems and how to defend against it. Every technique has a free lab you can play in your browser.
Prompt injection is giving an AI system text that changes its behaviour against the wishes of whoever built it. A developer writes instructions for the assistant. A user, a document or a web page then supplies more text. The model reads all of it as one stream and cannot always tell whose instructions should win.
It is the first entry, LLM01, in the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025. It holds that position because every application built on a language model is exposed to it, and because most other attacks on AI systems begin with it.
Direct prompt injection is typed by the person using the AI. They ask the assistant to ignore its rules, reveal its hidden instructions or act outside its purpose.
Indirect prompt injection is more serious. The attacker never talks to the AI. They place instructions in something it will read later: an email, a web page, a support ticket, a code comment, a file. When a user asks the AI to work on that content, the AI may follow the planted instructions with that user's access.
In a traditional application, code and data are kept apart. A database knows which part of a query is the command and which part is the value. A language model has no such separation. Instructions and data are both just text.
Filters help and none is complete, because there are unlimited ways to phrase an instruction. For that reason the defences that work best do not try to detect every injection. They limit what an injected model is able to do.
These cases were disclosed in 2025. Each links to its original report.
Aim Security disclosed EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711). A single crafted email carried hidden instructions that Copilot later read as part of its context. Copilot then placed internal data into a link that the client loaded automatically, so nothing had to be clicked. Microsoft fixed it on the server side and said it had seen no exploitation.
Source: The Hacker News
Invariant Labs showed that an issue filed on a public repository could steer a coding agent connected through the GitHub MCP server. When the developer asked the agent to look at open issues, it followed the text inside one, read private repositories and published their contents in a public pull request.
Source: Invariant Labs
Researchers showed a Cursor agent connected to Supabase with the service-role key reading a customer support ticket that contained instructions. The agent ran SQL with its own full privileges and wrote private integration tokens back into the ticket thread, where the attacker could read them.
Source: Simon Willison
Brave found that Comet's "summarise this page" feature passed page content to the model without separating it from the user's request. Hidden text in a Reddit comment could direct the browser agent to open the user's email and retrieve a one-time login code.
Source: Brave
Noma Security placed instructions in the description field of a public Web-to-Lead form. When an employee later asked the agent about that lead, it followed them and sent CRM data to a domain that was still on Salesforce's allow-list although it had expired. The researchers bought it for five dollars.
Source: The Hacker News
Legit Security hid instructions in a pull request comment that Copilot Chat read when a developer asked about the change. Copilot then leaked private source code and secrets through image addresses routed via GitHub's own image proxy. GitHub switched off image rendering in Copilot Chat.
Source: Legit Security
Johann Rehberger showed that a document with hidden instructions could make Gemini save false information to a user's long-term memory. The instructions waited for ordinary words the user was likely to type later, which got round the guard against tools running straight from untrusted content.
Source: InfoQ
Once an attacker can steer the model, the result depends on what the model can reach.
It is tricking an AI by giving it text that it treats as instructions. The text can be typed by the user or hidden in content the AI reads.
They overlap but are not the same. Jailbreaking tries to get around the safety rules built into the model. Prompt injection tries to override the instructions of the application built on top of it.
Not with current models. It can be made much harder and far less damaging by limiting what the model can access and do.
An attack where the instructions arrive inside content the AI reads on a user's behalf, such as a web page or an email, and not from the user.
Use labs built for the purpose. The labs on this page run in your browser against practice targets, so nothing real is attacked.
More guides: LLM Jailbreaking · OWASP LLM Top 10 · AI red team certification · All free labs
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