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Applied AI Engineer - Startups at OpenAI
A mid-level LLM and GenAI Engineer role at OpenAI, based in London, UK. Mid-level LLM engineers build production GenAI applications: designing prompts, implementing RAG systems, evaluating model outputs, and deploying guardrails. Interviews test your ability to spot injection vectors, design secure retrieval pipelines, evaluate quality and safety, and reason through latency and cost trade-offs.
- 8 skills
- 10 interview questions
- 6 labs
The role
- CompanyOpenAI
- LocationLondon, UK
- ListedYesterday
- LevelMid
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Skills this role needs
- Prompt injection attack and defenseDirect attacks on LLM apps; you must recognize vectors and harden prompts against them.
- RAG security and poisoningRetrieval systems are attack surfaces; you must design ingestion, retrieval ranking, and cache safely.
- Agent hijacking and tool safetyAgents with tool access are powerful and exploitable; you must control what agents do with outputs and approvals.
- Output validation and rendering safetyModel outputs flow to users, databases, and other systems; unsafe rendering causes XSS, SQL injection, and data leaks.
- Evaluation metrics and quality gatesYou must measure whether the model is safe and accurate; weak evals hide failures and security gaps.
- Cost and latency optimizationProduction LLM apps fail on cost or slowness; you must balance model choice, context size, and batching.
- LLM fingerprinting and probingUnderstanding what an LLM leaks through its outputs helps you design safer applications and defend against inference attacks.
- Indirect injection and supply chain threatsAttacks arrive through documents, tool results, and cached memory; you must assume untrusted input at every boundary.
Labs to practise
Hands-on labs on this site that match the work in this role. They run in the browser.
- AI Prompt Injection — Sales BotLab
- AI Refusal Suppression — Prefix InjectionLab
- AI Prompt Firewall — Detect Multi-Stage Bypass Attempts (Defender's Lab)Lab
- AI Jailbreak — Multi-turn Roleplay BypassLab
- AI Embedding Poisoning — Manipulate RAG Retrieval RankingLab
- AI Agent Hijacking — Indirect Tool Call InjectionLab
Courses that help
Tutorials to read
- AI Agent Hijacking Lab: A Document That Hijacks the BotTutorial
- AI Tool-Output Injection Lab: Hostile Search Results Drive the AgentTutorial
- AI Pentesting 2026: The Day Traditional Pentesting Stopped Working | Offensive AI Operator Course Day 1 of 30Tutorial
- AI Recon: Fingerprint Any LLM App in 10 Minutes | Offensive AI Operator Day 2 of 30Tutorial
- AI Security Automation 2026 — CI/CD LLM Security Testing Guide | AI LLM Hacking Course Day 35 of 90Tutorial
- AI Adversarial Document Lab: Crafted Markdown Defeats the SummariserTutorial
Mock interview questions
Ten questions from our LLM and GenAI Engineer question set, picked for this listing. Answer in your own words first, then open what a strong answer covers.
You are building a RAG pipeline that ingests user-uploaded documents. Where in the pipeline can adversaries inject malicious instructions, and what checks would you add before indexing?
What a strong answer covers
- RAG ingestion security
- document validation
- untrusted input handling
A prompt that works in GPT-4 times out in Claude 3. Walk through how you would diagnose the latency issue and what trade-offs you would consider: longer context window, smaller model, or batching.
What a strong answer covers
- latency diagnosis
- model selection trade-offs
- cost-latency balance
An agent sends a tool call with an argument that looks benign but, when the backend processes it, executes unintended logic. Give an example and explain how output schema validation should catch it.
What a strong answer covers
- tool argument injection
- schema bypass
- validation layers
Your system renders LLM output as HTML in the browser. The model generates valid markdown that includes image alt-text with JavaScript. How is this vulnerable and how would you sanitize safely?
What a strong answer covers
- LLM-output XSS
- markdown rendering risks
- output sanitization
An attacker uses many examples of a behavior in the conversation history to make the model ignore your instructions and do something unsafe. What is this attack called and how would you defend it?
What a strong answer covers
- many-shot jailbreaking
- in-context attack
- instruction robustness
Your LLM generates an authentication token. The backend accepts it without verification. Why is this dangerous and what should the backend do instead?
What a strong answer covers
- LLM-generated token forgery
- trust boundaries
- backend validation
An LLM app allows users to upload images for analysis. An attacker hides a jailbreak prompt in the image metadata and in invisible text. How would you detect and block this?
What a strong answer covers
- multimodal injection
- image parsing safety
- metadata validation
Your RAG system retrieves documents, but the model uses them to construct a SQL query. An attacker poisons a document with SQL syntax that breaks out of the intended query. How is this different from a prompt injection and how do you defend it?
What a strong answer covers
- text-to-SQL injection
- RAG to downstream integration
- query construction safety
Your LLM app is queried by millions of users daily. You notice a few queries return unusually similar outputs that reveal model internals. What attack might this be and how would you detect it at scale?
What a strong answer covers
- model fingerprinting
- inference-time attacks
- anomaly detection at scale
You are building an evaluation benchmark to test your system's safety. It includes 100 adversarial prompts. What would cause your benchmark to give false confidence and how would you catch it?
What a strong answer covers
- evaluation overfitting
- benchmark limitations
- adversarial robustness testing
A 14-day preparation plan
- Days 1 to 3Start with fundamentals. Take the LLM Security Fundamentals course and work through the Prompt Injection From Zero course in parallel. Run the Prompt Injection — Sales Bot lab to see how injections work in practice. Read the AI Recon piece to understand how attackers fingerprint your LLM app. Focus on the mechanics of
- Days 4 to 7Dive into RAG and agent security. Complete the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications course. Work through RAG-focused labs: ai-review-rag-ingestion-1 and ai-rag-poisoning-1. Read the adversarial document lab notes. Run the agent hijacking and tool-output injection labs. Understand how untrusted input enters systems through
- Days 8 to 11Focus on evaluation, output safety, and cost. Take the Securing AI Agents and MCP course. Work through output validation labs: ai-llm-output-xss-1, ai-text-to-sql-injection-1, ai-tool-arg-command-injection-1. Read the fine-tuning security and multimodal security pieces. Practice sketching evaluation strategies and cost
- Days 12 to 14Synthesis and practice. Work through advanced labs you have not yet run: ai-agent-hijack-1, ai-embedding-poisoning-1, ai-role-confusion-1. Answer all 30 practice questions, focusing on reasoning through attack chains and defense layers. Prepare a mental model of your role: you build systems that resist prompt injection
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The interview questions, skills and plan on this page are SecurityElites practice material for this kind of role. They are not supplied or endorsed by OpenAI, and the real interview may differ.